We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with memory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum continuous-time stochastic game. This class of games includes stochastic differential games and continuous-time Markov games. Moreover, we study the limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes in the case when the auxiliary stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. We show that it lies in the convex hull of the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic punishment strategies.
Introduction
The paper is concerned with approximate equilibria for two player differential games. This problem is strongly connected with the theory of system of HamiltonJacobi PDEs. It is proved that if the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs admits a classical solution, then this solution is a Nash value for the corresponding nonzerosum differential game [13] . Moreover, in this case one can construct a feedback Nash equilibrium. This property is preserved in some cases when the system of HamiltonJacobi PDEs admits only generalized solution (see [7] , [10] ). However, up to now there is no existence theorem for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. Moreover, Bressan and Shen showed the ill-posedness of this system [8] .
A different way to construct Nash equilibria for the nonzero-sum differential game is based on so called punishment techniques. This approach guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria [20] , [23] , [36] . Using punishment technique, one can characterize the set of all Nash equilibrium values in the class of deterministic strategies [11] , [20] , [36] . Certainly, this set comprises the values corresponding to solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. However, within the punishment approach one can construct equilibria those are realized only by incredible threats. A natural way to select a proper Nash equilibrium is to restrict the attention to the so called Nash-Pareto solution of nonzero-sum games [20] . Unfortunately, this solution concept does not satisfy time consistency principle.
As it was mentioned in [8] , there are two possibilities to overcome these difficulties. The first way is to introduce some noise i.e. replace the original deterministic system with the stochastic system. The second way is to introduce a cooperation. In the paper we try to follow both ways. We assume that there exist an auxiliary continuous-time stochastic game with the dynamics close to the original deterministic one and a pair of functions satisfying a stability condition for the auxiliary game. We use this pair of functions and a slight cooperation to construct an approximate equilibrium in the original differential game. Note that the stability condition is always satisfied if the pair of functions solves the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs for the auxiliary stochastic game.
We allow auxiliary continuous-time stochastic games with dynamics given by generators of the Lévy-Khintchine type (see [21] for the general theory of generators of the Lévy-Khintchine type). This class of games includes stochastic differential games and continuous-time Markov games (i.e. games with the dynamics given by a continuous-time Markov chain). Note that both aforementioned cases are well studied. The stochastic differential games were studied using a system of parabolic PDEs in [4] , [5] , [14] , [15] , [18] , [31] , [32] . Another approach based on forward-backward stochastic differential equations was developed for the stochastic differential games in [17] , [19] , [29] . Punishment strategies were studied for this type of game in [9] . Note that approaches based on punishment and forward-backward stochastic differential equations are equivalent (see [33] ). The nonzero-sum Markov games were studied in [30] .
We assume that the players observe the state of the auxiliary stochastic system and can use a memory. This leads to public-signal correlated equilibria in the class of strategies with memory. The auxiliary stochastic game plays the role of a model of the original nonzero-sum differential game. The control with model strategies were first proposed for zero-sum differential games in [27] . They were applied to construct approximate equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games (see [2] ). In those papers only deterministic models were allowed. The stochastic models for zero-sum differential games were developed in [3] , [24] , [25] , [26] . In the paper we extend the mentioned results to the case of nonzero-sum differential games.
Note that, although the construction of public-signal strategies proposed in the paper goes back to the ideas of punishment strategies, it allows to design approximate equilibria based on the solution of the system of PDEs. We especially put an attention to the case when the model of the game is determined by a stochastic differential equation. In this case it is shown that one can construct an approximate equailibrium based on a strong solution of the system of parabolic PDEs. Additionally, we examine the limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes when the model stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. It is shown that any limit equilibrium outcome (that is a pair of numbers) lies in the convex hull of the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic punishment strategies. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of public-signal correlated approximate equilibria. The next section is concerned with the formulation of the main result. It states that, given an auxiliary nonzero-sum continuous-time stochastic game and a pair of continuous functions of position satisfying a stability condition for this auxiliary game, one can construct an approximate equilibrium for the original game. In Section 4 we examine the link between the systems of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs and the proposed stability condition. First, we consider the case of the auxiliary systems of the general form. It is proved that if a pair of functions is a classical solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs, then it satisfies the stability condition. Further, we study the special case when the auxiliary system is determined by a stochastic differential equation. In this case we show that if the pair of function is a generalized solution of the system of HamiltonJacobi PDEs, then the stability condition is satisfied. Moreover, we present the example demonstrating that the class of functions satisfying the stability condition is not exhausted by the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs even in the case of models given by stochastic differential equations. The limit of the approximate equilibrium outcomes is studied in Section 5. The other sections are concerned with the proof of the main result. In Section 6, given a pair of functions satisfying stability condition for the auxiliary continuous-time stochastic game, we construct a profile of public-signal correlated strategies. Its properties are examined in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 is devoted to the proof of the main result. To this end we show that the profile of public-signal correlated strategies designed in Section 6 is an approximate equilibrium.
Definitions and assumptions
We study the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamics given bẏ
Here u (respectively, v) denotes the control of the first (respectively, second) player. We assume that the purpose of the i-th player is to maximize the terminal payoff γ i (x(T )). Below we assume that U and V are metric compacts. To simplify notation we will also use the following designation:
To define the notion of approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium let us introduce some auxiliary definitions.
If Υ is a metric space, then denote by B(Υ) the corresponding Borel σ-algebra.
Informally, the concept of public-signal correlated strategies can be described as follows. We assume that both players at each time observe the random signal that is produced by an external device. Below this information will be a forecasting of a state of a game being a stochastic model of the original game. The players form their control using this shared information and the history of the game.
This idea can be formalized in the following way.
is a measurable space with a filtration;
(v) for any r, the restrictions of functions (
(vi) for any A ∈ F , the function x(·) → P x(·) (A) is measurable with respect to
Let us briefly comment this definition. First, it states that the choice of probability space is the part of the profile of strategies (condition (i)), whereas the probability of the random signal observed by the players depends on the sample path of the game (condition (ii)). Further, we assume that the players' controls are functions of the random signal and the sample path of the game (see condition (iii)). Moreover, conditions (iii) and (iv) mean that the random signal and the players' controls depend on the sample path in the nonanticipative way. Conditions (v) and (vi) are technical; they assure the measurable dependence of the players' controls and the probability of the shared signal on the history of the game.
The definition of the equilibrium involves unilateral deviations by the players. Usually this means that the player changes only her control. However, Definition 1 states that the probability space is a part of the profile of strategies. Thus, it is natural to allow the deviating player to choose her own probability space which can also comprise the probability space coming from the original profile of strategies. This lead to the following definition.
Definition 2. Given a profile of public-signal correlated strategies w = (Ω, F , {F t } t∈[t 0 ,T ] , P x(·) , u x(·) , v x(·) ), we say that a profile of strategies w
As above let us briefly comment this definition. Conditions (i)-(iii) means that now the signal consists of two parts: the random signal produced in the original strategy ω and the additional information ω ′ . Simultaneously, condition (iv) and (v) states that if the player does not deviates, then she does not observe the additional signal ω ′ . Notice that the public-signal profile of strategies is always a deviation from itself. Now let us introduce the motion generated by the public-signal correlated profile of strategies.
) be a profile of public-signal correlated strategies on [t 0 , T ]. We say that a pair (X(·), P ) is a realization of the motion generated by w and initial position (t 0 , x 0 ) if (i) P is a probability on F ;
where χ is a probability on C([t 0 , T ]; R d ) defined by the rule: for any A ∈ F t 0 ,T , χ(A) P {ω : X(·, ω) ∈ A}.
Below we say that the profile of strategies w is a profile of stepwise strategies if there exists a partition ∆ = {t j } r j=0 of the time interval [t 0 , T ] such that the equalities x(t j ) = y(t j ), j = 0, 1, . . . , r imply that
Note that if the profile of strategies w is stepwise, then, for any (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, T ] × R d , there exists at least one realization. Definition 4. We say that a profile of public-signal correlated strategies w * is a public-signal correlated ε-equilibrium at the position
for any profile of strategies w i that is an unilateral deviation from w * by the player i, the following inequality holds true:
To construct a public-signal correlated ε-equilibrium we use a solution of an auxiliary stochastic game with a dynamics determined by a generator of the Lévy-Khintchine type Λ t [u, v] . The general theory of such stochastic processes described by generator of the Lévy-Khintchine type is presented in [22] . Assume that, for each
Here B 1 stands for the ball of radius 1 centered at the origin; for each t ∈ [0, T ],
Remark 1. Let us briefly explain the meaning of the coefficients in (3). Here b stands for the deterministic evolution, G is a squared diffusion coefficient, whereas ν(t, x, u, v, ·) denotes the intensity of jumps. To illustrate this let us consider two examples. First, assume that the stochastic process Y (t) is determined by the controlled stochastic differential equation
In this case G(t, x, u, v) = σ(t, x, u, v)σ T (t, x, u, v), ν(t, x, u, v, dy) ≡ 0. Now, let us consider the pure jump processes. In this case (3) takes the form
This case can be interpreted as follows.
Given the state x, the value ν(t, x, u, v,
is a probability of transition to Υ if the jump takes place.
Furthermore, we assume that the objective function of the player i in the auxiliary stochastic game is equal to
Denote
We assume that the following conditions hold true:
(L1) U, V are metric compacts;
In condition (L8) δ is a small parameter.
Approximate equilibrium and stability condition
The main result of the paper involves a pair of functions (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfying a stability property (see Condition (C) below). Roughly speaking one can consider (c 1 , c 2 ) as value function of the nonzero-sum continuous-time stochastic game with the dynamics determined by the generator Λ t [u, v] and objective functions of the players given by (4) . The link between this stability property and system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs is given in Section 4. To formulate the stability condition we introduce the notion of controlled system admissible for the generator Λ t [u, v] . This notion uses the relaxed stochastic control of both players first introduced in [34] .
Denote the set of probabilities on a Polish space Υ by rpm(Υ). We endow rpm(Υ) with the narrow topology i.e.
This space is Polish [6] , [38] . Moreover, rpm(Υ) is compact when Υ is compact. The mapping z → δ z provides a natural embedding of Υ into rpm(Υ). Hereinafter δ z stands for the Dirac measure concentrated at z.
A stochastic process taking values in rpm(U) (respectively, in rpm(V )) is a relaxed stochastic control of the first (respectively, second) player. Furthermore, the stochastic process taking values in rpm(U × V ) is a relaxed stochastic controls of both players. If µ(t) (respectively, ν(t)) is a relaxed control of the first (respectively, second player), we write µ(t, du) (respectively, ν(t, dv)) instead of µ(t, ω)(du) (respectively, ν(t, ω)(dv)). Analogously, if η(t) is a relaxed control of both players, we write η(t, d(u, v)) for η(t, ω)(d(u, v)). Now let us introduce the notion of controlled system going back to [12] , [16] . This notion generalize the standard notion of deterministic controlled system. The main difference is that in the stochastic case we assume that the control and the motion of the system are stochastic processes defined on some filtered probability space, when the dynamics is determined by solution of martingale problem (see condition (iv) of Definition 5 below).
We say that a 6-tuple
(iv) for any φ ∈ D, the process
The following stability condition plays a key role in the construction of the approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium. 
(ii) for any y ∈ R d and v ∈ V , one can find a relaxed stochastic control of the first player µ 
(iii) given y ∈ R d and u ∈ U, one can find a second player's relaxed stochastic control ν s,r y,u , a process Y 2,s,r y,u and a probability P Informally speaking, the meaning of Condition (C) is as follows. The first part of this condition means that both players can maintain the value (c 1 (s, y), c 2 (s, y)) on the time interval [s, r] choosing an appropriate controlled stochastic system. Parts (ii), (iii) mean that if player i picks a constant control on [s, r], then the other player can find a controlled system such that the outcome of the player i on [s, r] is not greater than c i (s, y). Here we assume that the terminal part of the i-th player's reward on [s, r] is given by c i (r, ·). Additionally, to avoid technical issues we assume that all mentioned controlled systems exploit the same filtered measurable space. Notice that Condition (C) is an extension of the notion of u-stability first proposed in [27] to examine zero-sum differential games. The variant of Condition (C) for the case when Λ t [u, v] is given only by deterministic evolution was considered in [2] .
Further, let
• (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfies Condition (C).
Then, for any
, and ε > (RC + T )δ, there exists a profile of public-signal correlates strategies w * that is ε-equilibrium at (t 0 , x 0 ). Moreover, if X * and P * are generated by w * and (t 0 , x 0 ), E * denotes the expectation according to
To prove this Theorem we introduce the profile of stepwise public-signal correlated strategies in Section 6. The construction involves an auxiliary stochastic processes those can be regarded as models of the original game. The properties of these models are examined in Section 7. They play the crucial role in the proof of Theorem 1 that is presented in Section 8.
System of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs
In this section we specify Condition (C) and provide a link between this condition and a system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. First, we consider the case when the dynamics of the auxiliary system is given by the generator of the general form. For this case we prove that if c 1 , c 2 is a classical solution to the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, then it satisfies Condition (C). Additionally, we consider the specific case when the dynamics of the auxiliary system is determined by the stochastic differential equation. In this case we prove that if (c 1 , c 2 ) is the generalized (strong) solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, then Condition (C) holds.
Theorem 2. Assume that the functions
1. the functions c 1 , c 2 are of the class C 2 ;
2. for i = 1, 2,
3. 
, u ∈ U, v ∈ V ; moreover, one can find a common filtered measurable space with a filtration suitable for all mentioned problems.
Then, the pair (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfies Condition (C). In particular, for any
Remark 2. Notice that (9) is a system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs corresponding to the generator Λ t [u, v] and objective functions (4), whereas equations (10), (11) mean that u 0 (t, x) and v 0 (t, v) are Nash equilibrium feedback strategies.
) be a filtered measurable space suitable for the solution of the martingale problems for the generators
. Using the standard dynamical programming arguments, one can prove that the part (i) of Condition (C) is fulfilled.
To prove the second part of Condition (C) use the dynamic programming principle and (9), (10) letting P . Here Now let us restrict the attention to the case when the auxiliary system is given by the controlled stochastic differential equation
where W (t) stands for the m-dimensional Wiener process and σ :
d×m . This corresponds to the generator
with G(t, x, u, v) = σ(t, x, u, v)σ T (t, x, u, v). Thus, system (9) is now the system of second order PDEs:
However, to apply Theorem 2 directly to system (12) we are to assume that system (13) admits a classical solution. That is rather restrictive assumption. For the case when σ does not depend on u and v this assumption can be weakened. This result is proved by the dynamic programming arguments. It is a counterpart of [ We assume that the dynamics of the auxiliary system is determined by the stochastic differential equation of the following form:
This system corresponds to the generator
where G(t, x) = σ(t, x)σ T (t, x). We will study the link between the generalized solution of the system of parabolic equation corresponding to the game with dynamics (15) and condition (C) under the following additional assumptions: 
Here I stands for the identity matrix, whereas
Notice that now the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equation is the following system of parabolic equations:
This system is a variant of (13) with u
As it was mentioned above, we consider strong generalized solutions of system (16) . This solution concept relies on the following definitions. Let Υ be a subset of [0, T ] × R d . Denote by H 1+κ (Υ) the set of functions ϕ : Υ → R those satisfy Hölder condition for the exponent κ with its derivatives w.r.t. spatial variables. Further, let W 1,2 q (Υ) be the set of functions ϕ : Υ → R such that ϕ ∈ L q (Υ) and there exist generalized derivatives ∂ϕ/∂t, ∂ϕ/∂x i , ∂ 2 ϕ/∂x i ∂x j which belong to L q (Υ). (c 1 , c 2 ) is a strong solution of (16), (17) 
Definition 7. The pair
2. for any bounded Ξ ⊂ R d , and some κ ∈ (0, 1),
Note that any classical solution of (16), (17) is a strong solution.
Remark 3. There are several papers dealing with the link between the value functions of the stochastic differential games and strong solutions of the system of parabolic PDEs. Let us mention only [5] , [13] , [18] , [31] , [32] . In particular, for the case of stochastic differential games on the bounded domain of R d it is proved that if the functions u N and v N are continuous w.r.t. p i , there exists a strong solution of the corresponding system of parabolic PDEs that provides the Nash equilibrium in the stochastic differential game [15] (see, also, [4] , [5] ). The case when the strategies are not continuous was studied in [32] under some additional assumptions. Several existence results for system (16) , (17) were obtained in [18] . These results covers the cases when
• the drift is bounded whereas u N , v N are continuous w.r.t. adjoint variables;
• the drifts and the running rewards of the players have a separate structure whereas the strategies u N , v N are merely measurable.
Theorem 3. Let the auxiliary stochastic system be given by (14) . Assume that conditions (A1)-(A4) hold. If c 1 , c 2 is a strong generalized solution of (16), (17) , then (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfies condition (C) for generator Λ given by (15 
Here
is the limit of b * R (t, x) when R → ∞. Taking into account the definition of H i , we get that
Since (c 1 , c 2 ) is a solution of (16) ;
• for any ϕ ∈ D,
is a { F 
Here we denote b
. By condition (A4) using the same arguments as above, we get that
This proves part (ii) of Condition (C).
The following example is an illustration of Theorem 3.
Thus, (16) takes the form
This system has a strong solution [18, Theorem 3.1] . Theorem 1 provides that, given a solution of (23) one can construct an approximate equilibrium for the original nonzero-sum differential game. However, system (23) is highly nonlinear even in the simplest cases and can be solved only numerically.
The following example shows that the class of functions satisfying condition (C) is not limited by the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. Example 2. Consider the following controlled systeṁ
Assume that γ 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = ζx 1 − x 2 , γ 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = ζx 2 − x 1 . Here ζ ∈ (0, 1/2). Now let us introduce the auxiliary stochastic system. Put b = f , σ = δI (here I stands for the identity matrix), h 1 = h 2 = 0. We have that (16) takes the form
At the same time boundary condition (17) takes the form
It is easy to check that the functions c (24), (25) . Now let us consider the smooth functions c
. They do not solve system (24), (25) . However, the pair (c ) satisfies condition (C). Indeed, the auxiliary stochastic system in the example is dY (t) = (u(t) + v(t))dt + δW (t).
Here (26) . Here W 1 (t), W 2 (t) are components of the Wiener processes W (t). We have that 
Limit of ε-equilibria
In this section we compare the result presented in the paper with the approach to Nash equilibria based on the framework of punishment strategies (see [11] , [20] , [23] , [36] ). The main purpose of this section is to prove that the limit of ε-Nash equilibria constructed by Theorem 1 provides the Nash value in the class of punishment strategies.
Let Val i denote the value function of the zero-sum differential game with the dynamics (1) where the i-th player wishes to maximize her terminal payoff γ i (x(T )) and the other player wishes to minimize this outcome. One can assume that the players use deterministic strategies with memory. In this case the strategy of the first (respectively, second) player is a family of functions from
Analogously, a strategy with memory of the second player is a family of functions
. It suffices to consider only stepwise strategies. This means that there exists a partition of the time interval
. Denote the set of stepwise strategies with memory on [t 0 , T ] of the first (receptively, second) player by
One can prove the existence and uniqueness result for (27) .
It follows from [27] , [35] that
Moreover, [35, Theorem 13.3] implies that, for any compact G ⊂ R d , and ε > 0, there exists strategies u
Now, we turn to the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamics given by (1) and players' payoffs determined by γ i (x(T )). We consider Nash equilibria for this game within deterministic memory strategies as defined in [20] , [36] . For the sake of shortness, we recall only the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs. The precise definition of equilibrium in the class of deterministic memory strategy and the proof of characterization theorem can be found in [11] , [20] , [36] .
We denote the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs at 
Proof. Denote ε n 2(RC + T )δ n . By Theorem 1, for each n, there exists a publicsignal correlated profile of strategies
n -equilibrium at (t 0 , x 0 ). Let X n (·) and P n be generated by w n and initial position (t 0 , x 0 ).
Let us introduce the probability
Further, let S(t 0 , x 0 ) denote the set of solution of (28) . Notice that
• any x(·) in S(t 0 , x 0 ) is Lipschitz continuous with the constant M and satisfies the initial condition x(t 0 ) = x 0 .
Thus, by [6] we get that {χ n } is relatively compact with respect to the narrow convergence. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there exists a probability on C(
converges narrowly to χ. Note that each motion x(·) from supp(χ) satisfies (28) .
Further, by construction of χ n we have that
Here E n denotes the expectation according to the probability P n . By Theorem 1 and (29) we get
Passing to the limit when n → ∞, we conclude that
For a ∈ R, let a + denote a ∨ 0. Now, we shall prove that
First, we claim that, for any τ ∈ [t 0 , T ],
Indeed, assume for definiteness that
+ is continuous, and the probabilities χ, χ n are concentrated on the compact S(t 0 , x 0 ), there exists a number N 0 such that, for all n > N 0 ,
Moreover, one can assume that, for n > N 0 ,
Further, notice that
Denote by Ξ n τ the set of ω ∈ Ω n such that
) be the deviation by the first player from w n with u n,τ,ρ
Here G(τ ) = {x(τ ) : x(·) ∈ S(t 0 , x 0 )}, and u
is the first player's strategy that is ρ-optimal for the zero-sum differential game with the dynamics given by (1) and objective function γ 1 (x(T )) at any position from G(τ ).
Let X n,τ,ρ (·) and P n,τ,ρ be generated by w n,τ,ρ and (t 0 , x 0 ). Furthermore, let E n,τ,ρ be the expectation according to P n,τ,ρ . We have that,
This and (33) imply the inequality
Since ε n < ρ (see (34)), we get that w n is not a public-signal correlated ε nequilibrium. This contradicts with the choice of w n . Thus, (32) is fulfilled. Further, let m be a natural number, for k = 0, . . . , m, and let τ m k t 0 + (T − t 0 )k/m. Recall that, for any x(·) ∈ S(t 0 , x 0 ),
Additionally, the function Val i is Lipschitz continuous. Thus, there exists a constant C 1 such that, for any
Since χ is concentrated on S(t 0 , x 0 ), we have that
Using (32), we get that
Passing to the limit when m → ∞, we get (31). This implies that, for χ-a.e. x(·), (γ 1 (x(T )), γ 2 (x(T ))) is a Nash equilibrium value. Using (30), we obtain the conclusion of the Theorem.
Construction of near equilibrium strategies
The aim of this section is to construct a profile of public-signal correlated strategies w * for a given initial position (t 0 , x 0 ) ∈ [0, T ] × R d and any partition of the time interval [t 0 , T ]. Below (see Sections 7 and 8) we show that w * is an approximate equilibrium at (t 0 , x 0 ). This will prove Theorem 1.
First
The existence of these functions follows from the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski selection theorem [1, Theorem 18.13] . For θ ∈ R, putα
Recall that the pair of functions (c 1 , c 2 ) satisfies Condition (C) (see Definition 6) .
be an initial position, and let ∆ = {t k } n k=0 be a partition of the time interval [t 0 , T ]. The position (t 0 , x 0 ) and the partition ∆ are parameters for the profile of strategies w * defined below. However, we do not indicate the dependence of the profile of strategies on them assuming that (t 0 , x 0 ) and ∆ are fixed.
Denote by d(∆) the fineness of ∆. Let the filtered measurable space
and families of stochastic processes Y
state for the expectations according to the probabilities
Now let us define the public-signal correlated profile of strategies
Notice that the elements of Ω * are 3n-tuples ω = (ω 
• if, for all j = 1, . . . , k,
• if inequality (42) violates for some j = 1, . . . , k, then define the processes
by the rule:
in the case when (42) is fulfilled for all j = 1, . . . , k and
when (42) violates for some j = 1, . . . , k.
For
is extended to the whole σ-algebra G k in the standard way. It is easy to check that the restriction of P k,x(·) on G k−1 coincides with P k−1,x(·) .
To complete the definition of the probability P * x(·) observe that G n = F * and set
Let us clarify the meaning of the processes
. They play the role of models of the game. The process Y 0 is used when the both players behave according to w * , whereas Y 1 x(·) (respectively, Y 2 x(·) ) works when the second (respectively, first) player deviates.
Properties of the models of the game
First, let us consider the case when both players form their control according to the profile of strategies w * . Let X * (·), P * be generated by w * and (t 0 , x 0 ). Denote by E * the expectation according to P
Further, denote by η 0 k the stochastic process with values in rpm(U × V ) defined by the rule:
Notice that, for any φ ∈ D, the process
Lemma 1. The following statements hold true:
2. for k = 1, . . . , n,
Proof. The proof is close to the proof of [3, Lemma 14] . First, assume that, for j = 0, . . . , k − 1,
Thus, on each time interval [t k−1 , t k ] the process X * is F * t k−1 -measurable. Notice that, for t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ], the following condition holds in the almost sure sense:
We have that, for t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ],
Assuming that δ ≤ 1, using that (45) is {F * t } t∈[t k−1 ,t k ] -martingale for any φ ∈ D, and conditions (L5), (L8), one can prove that
whereα(·) is defined by (38) . The proof of (49) is similar to the proof of [3, Lemma 13] .
).
Since (45) is a martingale for any φ ∈ D, using the definitions of the generator Λ t [u, v] and the function g (see (3) and (6) respectively), we get that
Here we denote l z 1 ,z 2 (x) x − z 1 , z 2 − z 1 .
Since Λ t [u, v]l z 1 ,z 2 (x) = g(t, x, u, v), z 2 − z 1 , we conclude that
To simplify notation, put
Note thatû k andv k are random variable measurable w.r.t. F * t k−1 . Combining (48), (49), (50) and (51), we get
where β is defined by (7) . Hence, assumption (47) implies (46) for given k = 0, . . . , n. Thus, by construction of the profile of strategies w * under assumption (47) the equality Y 0 (t) = Y * ,1 (t) = Y * ,2 (t) holds true for t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ]. To complete the proof it suffices to recall that Y 0 (t 0 ) = Y * ,1 (t 0 ) = Y * ,2 (t 0 ) = X * (t 0 ) = x 0 and use the induction.
Lemma 1 and the fact that X * (t 0 ) = Y 0 (t 0 ) = x 0 immediately imply the following. • Ω 1 = Ω * × Ω ′ ;
• F 1 = F * ⊗ F ′ ;
• F • for any x(·) ∈ C([t 0 , T ]; R d ), t ∈ [t 0 , T ], ω ∈ Ω * , ω ′ ∈ Ω ′ , v x(·) (t, ω, ω ′ ) = v * x(·) (t, ω).
Let X 1 and P 1 be generated by w 1 and (t 0 , x 0 ). Below E 1 stands for the expectation according to P 1 . Denote
For t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ], put
Lemma 2. The following inequality holds true, for k = 1, . . . , n,
Proof. Notice (see (43)) that, for t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ], the control of the second player is a random variable equal tov
By construction,v k is a measurable w.r.t. F
